Apart from agency conflicts and information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, potential investors or creditors, which prevent companies from making optimal investment decisions, government intervention is another form of friction, especially common in the economic transitional settings, distorts corporate investment behavior and leads to investment inefficiency. Chinese investment system reform in 2004 aims to restrict government intervention on corporate investment and causes an exogenous shock to firm's investment environment. In the quasi-natural experiment, difference-in-differences analysis shows that investment efficiency promotes after the investment system reform and the result is robust to an alternative model specification and placebo test. Further analysis shows that the improvement of investment efficiency concentrates among non-SOEs. The findings indicate that the investment system reform in China has alleviated the government intervention in corporate investment and improved the firm's investment efficiency as well.
Introduction
Market frictions such as agency conflicts and information asymmetry have long recognized as the suspects causing firms to deviate from their optimal investment level [1] . A large literature expands on these frictions, of which empirical evidence supportive is extensive [2] [3] . Yet, there still exist other frictions, such as government intervention that can lead to suboptimal corporate investment [4] [5] .
Although government intervention in business is not unique in China, the Chinese setting is particularly interesting for the following reasons. Firstly, the Chinese government can play a vital role in the domestic business activities through its majority ownership in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The goal of these enterprises is not only to maximize their shareholders' wealth, but contains lots of political purposes. Although private companies and foreign-invested firms (non-SOEs) are growing in number and have pulled a large part of Chinese economic growth after the Economic Reform and Opening Up in 1978 [6] , SOEs still dominate the country's business activities. Furthermore, the government can also maintain its control on both SOEs and non-SOEs through appointing political connected executives. Firms with political connections usually have to adjust their business decisions to cater to the government's goals.
Chen et al. (2011) [4] used government ownership and political background of the firm's top executives (political connections) as the proxies of government intervention and found that SOEs, especially those with political connected executives, have lower investment efficiency. While Deng et al. (2017) [5] focused on the economic stimulus package (ESP) led by China's government during the 2008 global financial crisis period, which provides positive shock to the supply of external finance, together with the government intervention, leading to government-intervened firms overinvested and their investment efficiency declined after the ESP. Both the empirical findings suggest that government intervention plays a negative role in the corporate investment efficiency. This paper aims to extend the empirical research on government intervention in corporate investment from the opposite site, basing on an event that is likely to have alleviated the impact of government intervention in corporate investment, namely "the Decision of the State Council on Investment System Reform" ("Decision") in China in 2004.
Before the Economic Reform and Opening Up in 1978, when Chinese economy was primarily centrally planned, the government largely controlled the country's economic output by allocating resources and determining market prices. SOEs and quasi-SOEs (collective enterprises) occupied in almost every sector, while private enterprises and foreign-invested firms were nearly nonexistent [7] . Simply put, the enterprises in China before 1978 were merely the appendage to the Chinese government, and the investment policies they made just reflected the will of the government.
From 1978 to 2004, with the continuous deepening of the economic reform, non-SOEs had become involved in sectors that had previously been monopolized by SOEs, and the government had been trying to implement a series of market-oriented investment reform policies. Unfortunately, these policies had little effect on the restriction for the government intervention in corporate investment decision.
The investment system reform or the "Decision" announced in 2004 clearly pointed out for the first time that companies should be the primary investment-decision-makers, which meant that the government should return the in- First, after the investment system reform, the corporate investment efficiency promotes. The reform can remedy the distortion of investment behavior regardless of overinvestment or underinvestment, through restricting the "grabbing hand" of the government [9] . Moreover, the effect of the reform on the firm's investment efficiency varies across SOEs and non-SOEs. I find that the promotion of the corporate investment efficiency concentrates among non-SOEs, and I postulate that even if returning the investment-decision rights to the market, SOEs still have burden of catering to the political purposes. Thus, the investment system reform has little impact on SOEs. This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, this paper provides empirical evidence to the research on corporate investment efficiency. Previous studies in this area are mainly focused on the agency conflicts and information asymmetry between managers and shareholders or potential investors in the mature markets. However, in a transitional economy, the government intervention is another vital friction that leads to firm's suboptimal investment policy. The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides theoretical framework and hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 reports the empirical results, robustness tests and heterogeneity test. Section 5 concludes this paper.
Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development
When we talk about what drives the firms' deviate from its optimal investment level, agency conflicts and information asymmetry are always the top two factors that come to our minds [1] . Chen et al. (2011) [4] opened a new chapter that government intervention is also a vital friction that leads to the firm's suboptimal investment behavior. They used government ownership and political connections as the proxies of government intervention to figure out that this kind of friction play a negative role in the corporate investment efficiency. Deng et al. [4] are not the first one who bring forward the impact of government intervention in corporate investment. We can trace back to the "grabbing hand" theory, established in a famous book, "The grabbing hand: government pathologies and their cures", wrote by Shleifer and Vishny (1998) [9] . They used the "grabbing hand" to describe the government intervention in the firm's business activities and their model established in chapter 9 shows that the politicians tend to convince of the managers to overinvest because they can obtain political benefits from the overinvestment, while the managers dislike overinvestment for it hurts the benefits of the shareholders. Therefore, the equilibrium of the firm's investment level depends on the bargain ability between the politicians and managers. In this sense, the "grabbing hand" of the government, which interfere in the business activities, usually distorts the corporate behavior and leads to suboptimal decision.
If there is a policy that is designed to restrict the "grabbing hand" on the business activities, the distortion of the corporate investment can be mitigated. H2. The promotion of investment efficiency mainly concentrates among non-SOEs after the investment system reform.
Research Design

Methodology and Model
Unlike the existent empirical research on the impacts of government intervention in corporate investment efficiency, which examine the relationship directly, this paper stands at the opposite site to find out whether the corporate investment efficiency has improved when restricting or removing the government intervention. If the restriction or the removal can help to promote the corporate investment efficiency, it means the government intervention does play a negative role in the firm's investment efficiency. This paper uses the reform of investment system in China in 2004 as a quasi-natural experiment setting to examine the relationship between government intervention and corporate investment efficiency. The difference-in-differences (DiD) regression model is illustrated as: 
_ i j t i j t t i j t t i j t i j t
Inv effi
Subscripts i, j, and t represent the firm, industry, and the quarter, respectively.
The dependent variable
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is measured by the residual model developed by Richardson (2006) [8] . 
Sample and Data
The investment system reform was proposed on July 16 
Empirical Results
Main Results
I study the government intervention in corporate investment efficiency by estimating Equation (1) and Table 2 presents the coefficient estimates. Column (1) and (2) have tested how the reform affected firm's overinvestment while column (3) and (4) (1) after the PSM. The dependent variable is the investment residual calculated from Richardson (2006) , which is the proxy of the firm's investment efficiency. The key explanatory that examine the impact of the reform on the firm's investment efficiency is Reform*Time. Reform*Time is a dummy equal to 1 when firm affected by the reform. Column (1) and (2) reports the results in overinvestment situation while column (3) and (4) reports the results in underinvestment situation. I report p-value in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at two-digit industry level. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The results are reported in Table 3 Table 4 .
Robustness Test
Conclusion
This paper investigates the relationship between government intervention and corporate investment efficiency. In the quasi-natural experiment settings that provide an exogenous shock to firm's investment environment and restrict government intervention, the difference-in-differences analysis shows that the investment efficiency promotes after the investment system reform. The result is [8] . The key explanatory that examine the impact of the reform on the firm's investment efficiency is also Reform*Time. Reform*Time is a dummy equal to 1 when firm affected by the reform. Column (1) and (3) are the regression results of Equation (2), while Column (2) and (4) are the regression results of Equation (1) using the sample from 2002q1 to 2004q2. Column (1) and (3) include year and firm fixed effect, while Column (2) and (4) include dummy variables reform and time. All specification include size, leverage and cash. I report p-value in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at two-digit industry level. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. [8] . The key explanatory that examine the impact of the reform on the firm's investment efficiency is Reform*Time. Reform*Time is a dummy equal to 1 when firm affected by the reform. In Column (1), I separate treated firm based on their ownership structure in overinvestment situation, while column (2) reports the results in underinvestment situation. All specification includes reform, time, size, leverage and cash. I report p-value in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at two-digit industry level. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
